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Background

Drone Warfare in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Historically, military airpower was defined by multi-million-dollar platforms reserved for superpowers. However, the Russo-Ukrainian War has dismantled this paradigm, creating a battlefield defined by the unprecedented consumption of cheap, expendable drones. In this conflict, drones have grown from being used primarily for reconnaissance to delivering ammunition, directing artillery fire, and carrying explosives.[1] They are responsible for destroying 85% of Russian military targets, causing 70-80% of Russian casualties, and initiating the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the front line.[1]

It is estimated that 2.2 million unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were produced in Ukraine in 2024.[1] Ukraine's drone industry has boomed with startup drone companies and production,[1] but Ukraine also relies heavily on foreign support.[2] In response, Russia has developed a greater internal drone production capacity than Ukraine, but still relies on Chinese, French, and Iranian drone designs and suppliers[2] for smaller, lightweight drones.[3] Both countries have integrated drone warfare into their doctrines and have created branches exclusively for overseeing drone usage.[1][3]

Because neither side could independently sustain this industrial appetite, doors have opened for external actors to proliferate drone warfare on this front with their own competing agendas. We begin by examining how actors outside of Russia and Ukraine have contributed to this proliferation.

Chinese Manufacturers

Chinese drone manufacturers supply a substantial portion of Ukraine's UAVs, especially lightweight drones, which are advantageous for easy maneuvering and transport.[4] Outside of assembled drones, they supply most of the parts used to make drones.[1] These companies use drone warfare to advance their financial, political, and commercial interests persistently; despite sanctions, Chinese drones continue to show up on the Russo-Ukrainian front.[5]

Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI)

As of 2021, privately-owned DJI held 76% of the global market share for drone manufacturing6], supplying to clients including but not limited to USA, Ukraine, Russia, ISIS, China, and Israel. Their DJI Mavic drone is popular on the Russo-Ukrainian front because, according to [CNAS thinktank advisor Samuel Bendett: “DJI Mavic is an easy-to-use drone right out of the box.”[4] Since the war's beginning, DJI has released statements condemning the use of their products to cause harm.[7] However, DJI drones have remained prominent on the front years after such statements when the war began.[5]

Autel Robotics

Autel Robotics is another privately owned drone supplier to both Russia[8] and Ukraine.[9] It has been sanctioned by the UK[10] and the United States[11] due to suspected ties to the Chinese military and Chinese affiliates, such as Shenzhen Huasheng Industry Co. Ltd. Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence reports: “They use so-called shell companies, change names, do everything to avoid... sanctions for their activities."[12] Autel is under suspicion for many ties to shell companies aiding Russian UAV production.[13]

To avoid these sanctions, Aero-HIT, a state-affiliated Russian drone manufacturer, seeks to develop Autel’s EVO Max 4T drone in Khabarovsk, Russia, near the Chinese border.[14] Autel continues to be sanctioned despite its statement that the “company has never participated in any military-related activities and firmly rejects the improper use of its products."[15]

Iranian State Actors

Diagram of a Shahed-136, a low-cost loitering munition exported and localized for mass production in Russia.

Diagram of a Shahed-136, a low-cost loitering munition exported and localized for mass production in Russia. (Image: Alexpl, CC BY 4.0)

Operating independently from Iran's conventional military, the IRGC-AF plays a critical role in the development of Iran's drone program, positioning itself as an asymmetrical equalizer against Western air superiority. This military branch and its commander, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, were directly sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for facilitating the supply of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine.[16] Because Iran is subject to extensive economic restrictions, it also relies on decentralized procurement networks. Coined by the Atlantic Council, the "Axis of Evasion" refers to the network of adversaries that bypass global sanctions to illegally source commercial Western technology (like navigation components and semiconductors) from global markets, funneling them into Iranian weapons manufacturing.[17]

Agendas Behind the Arsenal

The IRGC-AF’s contribution rapidly evolved from off-the-shelf hardware supply to exporting raw intellectual property and technical expertise. By transferring blueprints, materials, and engineering techniques to the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, they enabled Moscow to localize the mass production of Shahed-type drones.[18]

This proliferation serves multiple agendas for Iran. The Ukrainian front functions as a "global laboratory". By testing drones against advanced Western air defenses, Iran extracts critical data to harden its own technology and adapt commercial electronics for navigation and electronic warfare. Iran trades drone proliferation for Russian military modernization in a strategy of tactical reciprocity. Supplying drone technology enabled Iran to secure advanced capabilities and manufacturing capacity in return, creating a self-reinforcing production network between Moscow and Tehran.[17]

A core geopolitical agenda driving this proliferation is asymmetric bankruptcy. Inexpensive weapons deliberately drain resources designed to counter more advanced threats. While a Shahed drone typically costs around $20,000 to $50,000,[19] a single Patriot interceptor missile costs roughly $3 million to $4 million.[20] This cost mismatch forces defenders into an unsustainable economic deficit, weaponizing the cost of modern air defense.

While the Iranian state benefits geopolitically from this strategy, the domestic consequences for the Iranian people are severe. The diversion of state funds toward military expansion and the "Axis of Evasion" deprives public infrastructure and economic development of critical resources. Furthermore, the international sanctions triggered by this drone proliferation disproportionately impact ordinary citizens, driving hyperinflation, widespread unemployment, and shortages of essential goods.[21] Ultimately, the regime's pursuit of asymmetric external power is heavily subsidized by the socioeconomic attrition of its own people.

U.S. Defense Companies

U.S. defense companies play a central role in shaping modern drone warfare by linking military needs, technological innovation, and economic incentives. Rather than acting as neutral suppliers, these firms actively influence how warfare evolves by determining what technologies are available, scalable, and practical on the battlefield.

In Ukraine, U.S. defense companies have supplied drone systems, surveillance tools, and counter-drone technologies that have expanded the role of drones in combat.[22] They have helped shape battlefield capabilities and contributed to making drones a routine part of warfare. This reflects a broader shift from specialized, high-cost systems to widely deployable technologies. Drones are no longer rare assets; they are expected tools. This shift shows how defense companies help normalize drones as everyday military tools rather than rare specialized weapons.

Defense companies operate within a profit-driven system, meaning increased conflict and demand can accelerate production and innovation. As drones become cheaper and more effective, companies have incentives to promote their continued use. This creates a feedback loop where technological capability and military dependence reinforce each other.

At the same time, U.S. defense companies remain embedded in global supply chains. Even advanced military drones often rely on internationally sourced components, including electronics that may originate in competing countries.[23] This complicates traditional ideas of national security.

Violent Non-State Actors

Due to the deadliness and accessibility of drone technology, many Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) have begun increasing their drone arsenals to stage attacks on countries, organizations, and civilians. Violent Non-State Actors are defined as individuals or groups, independent of governments, which threaten or use violence to achieve their goals[24]. The most common subgroup of VNSAs are terrorist groups, but individuals, including civilians, can also be considered VNSAs. Since VNSAs are unaffiliated with governments, there are few regulating bodies or policies that can curtail or ban VNSA’s access and use of drones. This makes combat increasingly difficult as drones are significantly cheaper than the systems used to shoot them down.

Russian Imperial Movement (RIM)

The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and other paramilitary groups in Russia have used Ukraine as a training ground to test and deploy drones. The RIM is a far-right paramilitary group based in Russia. They are ultra-nationalist and pro-monarchist with the goal of restoring the Russian Empire; they supported Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion of Ukraine in 2022[25]. After the war mobilization in 2022 due to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the RIM began their Imperial Legion unit, a unit that trains private Russian civilians to fight alongside the Russian military. In RIM’s Partizan training camp, they run a course that trains drone operators with the purpose of sending those graduates to the Ukraine front[26].

Ukrainian Civilians

While VNSAs are commonly associated with organizations like terrorist groups, they also encompass civilians. In the Russo-Ukraine War, Ukrainian civilians have leveraged easy access to drones and open source software to help their country in the war effort[27]. Using resources like Telegram and dark web forums, ordinary civilians are able to find instructions on how to design effective drone weaponry. Groups have also been able to leverage non-open source software through exploits. The Russian and Ukrainian governments, along with civilians, have exploited vulnerabilities in software by reverse engineering code to use in their own drone software[28].

Future considerations

Drone warfare is a large topic with much nuance. This article mainly covers how countries, companies, and VNSAs have leveraged the proliferation of drones to further their own agendas. However, key participant groups such as civilians, military personnel, and the United Nations were not covered. Thus, some future topics to consider include: effects of drone usage on civilians, effect of drones on PTSD and casualties among military personnel, and drone policy on the international stage. The accessibility to drones and its use by non-governmental actors shares similarities to the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Wars in the Middle East post-9/11. Another potential topic could be how drones and IEDs have affected military tactics and negotiations in the 21st century.

References

Where this page came from

This page was imported from Wikibooks. From “Lentis” on Wikibooks, by its contributors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Changed here: set as a page; navigation and edit links left out; each image under its own licence, credited in its caption.

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